Abstract. In this paper we present a model for the bias values associated with linear characteristics of substitution-permutation networks (SPN's). The rst iteration of the model is based on our observation that for su ciently large s-boxes, the best linear characteristic usually involves one active s-box per round. We obtain a result which allows us to compute an upper bound on the probability that linear cryptanalysis using such a characteristic is feasible, as a function of the number of rounds. We then generalize this result, upper bounding the probability that linear cryptanalysis is feasible when any linear characteristic may be used (no restriction on the number of active s-boxes). The work of this paper indicates that the basic SPN structure provides good security against linear cryptanalysis based on linear characteristics after a reasonably small number of rounds.
Introduction
A substitution-permutation network (SPN) is a basic cryptosystem architecture which implements Shannon's principles of \confusion" and \di usion " 15] , and which was rst proposed by Feistel 4 ]. An SPN is in some sense the simplest implementation of Shannon's principles. Its basic structural elements of substitution and linear transformation are the foundation of many modern block ciphers, as can be seen from the current AES candidates (for example, Serpent uses a straight SPN structure 1]). Viewing the basic SPN architecture as a \canon-ical" cryptosystem has provided a useful model for study, yielding a range of analytical and experimental results 6] 7] 17].
In this paper we consider the linear cryptanalysis of SPN's, developing a model which allows us to bound the probability that a linear attack based on linear characteristics will succeed. The result is of interest because, in practice, linear cryptanalysis often relies on carefully chosen linear characteristics. It should be noted, however, that to achieve \provable security" against linear cryptanalysis, resistance to linear hulls, the counterpart of di erentials in di erential cryptanalysis, must be demonstrated (see Nyberg 13] ).
Substitution-Permutation Networks
A substitution-permutation network processes an N-bit plaintext through a series of R rounds, each round consisting of a substitution stage followed by a permutation stage. In the substitution stage, the current block is viewed as M n-bit subblocks, each of which is fed into a bijective n n substitution box (s-box), i.e., a bijective function mapping f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g n . This is followed by a permutation stage, originally a bit-wise permutation, but more generally an of (R + 1) N-bit subkeys, denoted K 1 ; K 2 ; : : : ; K R ; K R+1 , from the original key, K, via a key scheduling algorithm. Subkey K r is XOR'd with the current block before round r, and subkey K R+1 is XOR'd with the output of the last round to form the ciphertext. For the purpose of what follows, we will assume that K is an independent key 2], a concatenation of (R + 1) N-bit subkeys which are not necessarily derivable from some master key via a key-scheduling algorithm (therefore K 2 f0; 1g N(R+1) ).
Decryption is accomplished by running the SPN \backwards," reversing the order of the rounds, and in each round performing the inverse linear transformation followed by application of the inverse s-boxes (subkey K R+1 is rst XOR'd with the ciphertext, and each subkey K r is XOR'd with the current block after decryption round r).
For the purpose of this paper, we adopt an SPN structure with M = n s-boxes of size n n (n 2) in each round (therefore N = n 2 ), and an interround permutation : f0; 1g N ! f0; 1g N which connects output bit j of s-box i in round r to input bit i of s-box j in round r + 1 8], as in Figure 1. (We use the convention that all numbering proceeds from left to right, beginning at 1.)
In our model, each s-box in the SPN is chosen uniformly and independently from the set of all bijective n n s-boxes. In addition, we make the assump- The basic linear attack attempts to extract the equivalent of one key bit, expressed as the XOR sum of a subset of key bits, using a linear equation which relates subsets of the plaintext (P), ciphertext(C) and key (K) bits: 
(increasing (reducing) the number of random plaintexts encrypted increases (reduces) the probability that the key bit will be determined correctly).
One-Round Linear Characteristics
A system linear approximation such as (3) (6) by Matsui's Piling-up Lemma 9] . Note that jb r j b r ia for 1 a A.
It follows from the above, and from equations (1) and (2) (8) has the form of (3) (holding with probability p = b + 1 2 , over the uniform distribution of plaintexts, P).
In order to break DES, Matsui used auxiliary techniques which allowed a single linear characteristic to be used for the extraction of more than one key bit 9] 11]. Since such techniques are not relevant to the discussion which follows, we do not present them here.
Model for Distribution of Biases
For the purpose of linear cryptanalysis, clearly the attacker is interested in the R-round linear characteristic whose accompanying bias is maximum in absolute value, termed the best linear characteristic (such a characteristic is not necessarily unique), since it minimizes N L (see (4) ). (For the auxiliary techniques mentioned in Section 4 and applied to SPN's, (R ? q)-round characteristics are used, for certain integers q 1). We limit our consideration to linear characteristics which activate one or more s-boxes in each round, since this is a necessary condition for the accompanying bias (computed using the Piling-up Lemma) to be nonzero. Note that this condition need not be enforced for linear characteristics of ciphers based on the Feistel network architecture, such as DES.
Let L R be the set of all R-round linear characteristics. For a xed SPN, i.e., for a xed set of s-boxes, and for a given 2 L R , let b( ) be the bias associated . We quickly observed that the best characteristic almost always involved one active s-box in each round (i.e., it belonged to L R R ), especially as the s-box dimension was increased. In fact, when 500 16-round SPN's with 8 8 s-boxes were generated at random, the best linear characteristic for the rst r rounds, 1 r 16, was always found to be in L R R . This is not fully intuitive|increasing the number of active boxes in a given round allows the search algorithm more choices for the input mask to the next round, potentially increasing the absolute value of the bias associated with that round; but it also decreases the absolute value of the bias for the round having multiple active s-boxes, by increasing the number of terms in the product of the Piling-up Lemma (see (6) computed over the uniform distribution of bijective n n s-boxes. The probability distribution given by Lemma 1 for n = 8 is plotted in Figure 2 (using a log 10 scale on the vertical axis). Before proceeding to the next lemma, it is useful to de ne the following two sets, for R 1 and n 2: H n = 1; : : : ; 2 n?2 H R n = f`1`2 `R :`r 2 H n for 1 r Rg : Lemma 2. Let 2 L R R . Then the set of possible nonzero values for b( ) is h 2 (n?2)R+1 : h 2 H R n ; (9) where the biases Proof. The number of ways to choose one active s-box per round is n R . For a given choice of active s-boxes, the n-bit output mask for the active s-box in round r, 1 r (R ? 1), is determined: it consists of all zeros with a 1 in position j, where j is the index of the active s-box in round r + 1. Similarly, the n-bit input masks for the active s-boxes in rounds 2 : : : R are determined. All that remains is the choice of input mask for the active s-box in round 1, and the output mask for the active s-box in round R. Since each such n-bit mask must be nonzero, we have (2 n ? 1) 2 choices, and the result follows.
The main result of this section is given in Theorem 1. First, however, it is useful to have the following intermediate result. 
= #L R R p R R ( ) ; (14) where (14) follows from (13) (14) and combining constant terms gives (12) , nishing the proof.
An Improved Result
Since the initial submission of this paper, we have been able to generalize the main result (Theorem 1). The improved result, given in Theorem 2 below, upper bounds the probability that linear cryptanalysis of an SPN using linear characteristics is feasible, with no restriction on the number of active s-boxes (of course, we still require a minimum of one active s-box per round). 
Comment on Proof and Computation
Arguing as in the proof of Theorem 1, it follows that each term in the sum of (15) of the form #L A R p A R ( ) is an upper bound on the probability that linear cryptanalysis is feasible using characteristics from L A R . Therefore the sum of all such terms is an upper bound on the probability that linear cryptanalysis using any 2 L R is feasible.
In order to extract useful values from (15) , it is necessary to transform the right-hand side into an expression which can be evaluated. The sub-terms p A R can be evaluated using a slightly modi ed version of Lemma 4. The main work lies in computing the sub-terms #L A R . We solved this in a recursive fashion.
The key observation is that if 2 L A R activates s-boxes in round R, then the sub-characteristic 0 obtained by removing round R is an element of L A? R?1 .
Counting the number of ways that an R th round with active s-boxes can be added to 0 , and summing over all values of , completes the computation. The details can be found in the full version of this paper.
Computational Results
The second computer program created to carry out this research computes the distribution of biases associated with an R-round characteristic 2 L R R , as given by Lemma 2. The program works iteratively, computing the distribution for a given round r before proceeding to round (r + 1). For n = 8 and R = 3, the resulting distribution has 28451 bias values. These are plotted in Figure 3 , using a log 10 scale for the y-axis. A modi ed version of the program used to determine the distribution of b( ) above, for 2 L R R , was used to evaluate this upper bound, by computing (14) .
Results for the case n = 8, N = 64 (so = 2 ?32 ), and R = 10 : : : 16 are presented in the second column of Table 1 . The third column of Table 1 gives the upper bound from the improved result of Theorem 2. In addition, the fourth column of Table 1 gives the experimental probability that (16) (17) This is based on the worst-case scenario (from the perspective of the cipher designer): the existence of an R-round linear characteristic in L R R , such that the absolute value of the bias associated with each active s-box is the maximum possible, namely ? 2 n?1 ? NL min =2 n . Evaluating (17) in the case n = 8 (N = 64), with NL min = 80, gives the values in the rightmost column of Table 1 . Taken alone, these lower bounds seem to imply that linear cryptanalysis of at least 16 rounds is feasible (in fact, (17) does not tell us that linear cryptanalysis becomes infeasible until R 22). However, the result of Theorem 2 shows this to be excessively pessimistic|the probability that linear cryptanalysis of an SPN is feasible, using any characteristic 2 L R , is small for R 12 (computed over all SPN's, as per our model). This evidence of resistance to linear cryptanalysis is especially interesting when compared to a result of Chen 3] , who showed that under certain assumptions about the XOR tables of the s-boxes, the same 64-bit SPN is also resistant to di erential cryptanalysis for R 12.
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a model for the bias values associated with linear characteristics of substitution-permutation networks. We rst considered linear characteristics which activate one s-box in each round, since experimentally these usually provide the best bias value. We determined the distribution of bias values which can be associated with such characteristics. This allowed us to evaluate an upper bound on the probability that linear cryptanalysis using such linear characteristics is feasible, as a function of the number of rounds. This probability is computed over all SPN's with s-boxes chosen uniformly and independently from the set of all bijective n n s-boxes.
We then gave a generalization of the above result, stating an upper bound on the probability that linear cryptanalysis of an SPN is feasible, with no restriction on the number of s-boxes activated by the linear characteristics used. Experimental data indicates that the restricted and the generalized upper bounds yield nearly identical values, supporting the observation that the best linear characteristics almost always activate one s-box per round.
The work of this paper further supports the idea that the basic SPN structure merits study, both as a source of theoretical results, and as a practical cipher architecture with good security properties after a relatively small number of rounds.
